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AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH CAROLINA’S
INCENTIVES TO THE BOEING COMPANY
Amanda S. Kuker*
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, South Carolina passed House Bill 3130.1 This bill
amends various existing South Carolina Code sections and provides
certain benefits, including tax exemptions and economic development
bonds to taxpayers who create 3,800 full-time jobs and invest a
minimum of $750 million within the state. 2 Although the bill does not
mention a specific corporation by name, the legislation and the political
movements that occurred around the time of its drafting strongly
suggest that it was drafted to incentivize the dominant U.S. aircraft
manufacturer, The Boeing Company (“Boeing”), to expand its presence
in South Carolina.3 Subsidies, such as those found in House Bill 3130,
are nothing new to the aircraft industry. 4 In fact, both Boeing and its
European rival, Airbus SAS (“Airbus”), have enjoyed the benefits of
similar subsidies in the past.5 Many of these subsidies, however, have
come under intense scrutiny by the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”).
The WTO was established in 1995 as an international
organization that oversees and facilitates international trade.6 One
hundred and fifty-three nations, which together account for over 97%

* Amanda S. Kuker is a joint-degree J.D. and International M.B.A.
candidate at the University of South Carolina School of Law and Moore School
of Business, Class of 2012. B.A. German, Davidson College 2008.
1
H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009).
2
Id.
3
See generally id.
4
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R (May 18, 2011) [hereinafter
European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft].
5
Id.
6
The WTO in Brief: What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Aug.
28, 2011).

166

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 8.1

of international trade, are members of the WTO.7 As a member nation,
a country participates in the negotiation of and agrees to be bound by
WTO treaties, which are then ratified in the member nation’s
parliament.8 When disagreements occur between members concerning
the interpretation of WTO treaties, the WTO provides a dispute
settlement venue with a “neutral procedure based on an agreed legal
foundation.”9 More specifically, the dispute settlement body of the
WTO “serves to clarify the provisions of the covered agreements ‘in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law’” as codified in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 10

7
The WTO in Brief: The Organization, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_e.htm
(last
visited Aug. 28, 2011).
8
Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited
Aug. 28, 2011).
9
Id.
10
Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 7.1, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint)];
Vienna Convention art. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Article 31
General rule of interpretation. 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the
purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty
which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties
as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account,
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b)
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation. Recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when
the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”).
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For the past seven years, the WTO has attempted to parse through
complex litigation between Boeing and Airbus. 11 Each company filed
an individual case against the other challenging the legality of subsidies
that its rival received.12 Many of the subsidies challenged in these
cases are similar to the incentives provided by South Carolina, which
raises the following question: do the incentives provided by South
Carolina violate WTO treaty law?
This paper examines the South Carolina incentive package under
the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(“SCM Agreement”). The first section provides a brief overview of the
background information pertinent to this paper’s discussion including a
chronology of the aircraft industry and overview of the historical,
political, and economic context in which the Airbus-Boeing dispute
arose. Section II lays out a concise synopsis of the SCM Agreement,
the core governing law. In Section III, the substantive analysis of the
South Carolina incentives begins. This section opens with a description
of each of the incentives provided for in House Bill 3130. Then, the
laws of the SCM Agreement are applied to South Carolina’s House Bill
3130. The fourth and final section not only summarizes the findings
outlined in the above sections, but also expounds on tangential issues,
such as the enforceability of the WTO’s rulings on the Airbus and
Boeing cases and the atypical development of the aircraft
manufacturing industry.

I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

An intense rivalry exists between Airbus and Boeing. While these
two main players presently dominate the aircraft industry, this has not
always been the case. The early aircraft industry in both the United
States and Europe was highly fragmented.13 Boeing stepped out in front
of its competitors at the height of World War II, when it proved
uniquely qualified to satisfy the increasing demand for specialized
military aircraft. This success eventually crossed over into the civil
sector in the 1950s, when Boeing unveiled its 707 jetliner. 14

11

See generally European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 4.
12
Id.
13
Robert Carbaugh & John Olienyk, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: An
Economic and Trade Perspective, 2 GLOBAL ECON. Q. 261, 263 (2001).
14
Id. at 262.
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Airbus was formed in 1970 as a Franco-German joint venture,
created to combat the United States’ dominance of the aircraft
industry.15 To kick-start its growth, Airbus received direct production
subsidies and government loans that covered up to 80% of its
development costs,16 paid below market interest rates, and occasionally
benefited from debt forgiveness. 17 Needless to say, Airbus gradually
usurped a significant proportion of the formerly United Statesdominated aircraft production market.18 By the 1990s, Airbus
accounted for 30% of all new plane orders, steadily encroaching on
Boeing’s 60% market share.19
According to United States trade officials, the Airbus subsidies
breached existing international trade agreements.20 More specifically,
United States trade officials alleged that the European subsidies
provided Airbus with a distinct competitive advantage: Airbus could
price its aircrafts at least 10% below cost. 21 The United States further
argued that Airbus would most likely never have survived its initial
years, let alone managed significant growth within the industry, but for
the generous subsidies Airbus received from European governments. 22
This tension marks the beginning of the Airbus-Boeing Dispute, a case
that will spend years in front of the WTO.

A. THE AIRBUS-BOEING DISPUTE
A key factor fueling the Airbus-Boeing Dispute is the duopolistic
structure of the aircraft industry. Airbus and Boeing are essentially the
only two large civil aircraft producers in the aircraft industry. Thus,
competition for market share has become a zero-sum game.23 In other
15
Boeing v. Airbus: The WTO Dispute that Neither Can Win, DEUTSCHE
BANK RESEARCH, 4 (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR
_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000205714.pdf. [hereinafter Boeing v.
Airbus].
16
Carbaugh, supra note 13, at 272.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 262.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 272.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Annemarie Michaela Spadafore, Excess Baggage: Weighing the
Contribution of Political and Corporate Interests in the WTO Cases over
Commercial Aircraft Subsidies 71, (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Miami University) (on file with Miami University).
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words, whenever a new large civil aircraft product is released, Boeing
and Airbus compete directly against each other for customers. 24 Each
sale closed by one company is a sale lost by the other. The effect of a
lost sale is exaggerated by the industry’s customer purchase trends.
The market’s core customers, large airlines and leasing companies, 25
tend to enter into multi-billion dollar, long-term contracts that require
multiple aircraft deliveries from the same producer over the course of
numerous years.26 For example, in 2005, Boeing closed a deal with
Qantas Airlines for forty-five aircraft plus twenty options and fifty
purchase rights.27 Entering large contracts such as these benefits an
airline company because it increases aircraft familiarity among the
company’s pilots.28 However, for the aircraft manufacturer, this
behavior significantly increases the detriment of a lost sale.
Whether Airbus or Boeing wins a sale frequently boils down to
one factor: price.29 A hot topic in the Airbus-Boeing Dispute, price is
often the distinguishing factor between Airbus’s and Boeing’s contract
bids,30 especially considering that nearly every aircraft model produced
by one company has a direct and nearly identical competitor product
from the other company. 31 In such a market environment, subsidies
become especially controversial because subsidies allow the recipient
company to either increase its non-operating cash flow or transfer its
decreased marginal unit cost through to its customers by lowering
prices.32 Furthermore, because each company possesses such a large
market share, each pricing decision affects the market price for large
civil aircrafts.33 Therefore, subsidies help companies win both sales
and market share.
24
Executive Summary of the First Written Submission by the European
Communities, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, 6, WT/-DS316 (Feb. 19, 2007), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu
/doclib/docs/2007/march/tradoc_133819.pdf [hereinafter Executive summary].
25
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1689.
26
Id. ¶ 7.1685.
27
Id. ¶ 7.1788.
28
Spadafore, supra note 23, at 71.
29
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1694.
30
Spadafore, supra note 23, at 71.
31
Boeing v. Airbus, supra note 15, at 3.
32
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶7.1699.
33
Id. ¶ 7.1688 (explaining the European Communities’ claim “that most
airlines that operate LCA are Boeing customers, and provides the following
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The Airbus-Boeing Dispute began in 2004 when the United States
terminated the then governing Bilateral EU-US Agreement of Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft (informally known as the 1992 Agreement) and
filed a case against the European Communities challenging the
European Communities’ subsidies to Airbus (“the Airbus case”). 34 In
turn, the European Communities immediately followed suit and filed a
similar case against the United States challenging the United States’
subsidies to Boeing (“the Boeing case”). 35 The two cases have been in
front of the WTO for the past seven years.
In each case, each party argues that the opponent nation’s aircraft
manufacturing subsidies have enabled the subsidized company to lower
its costs, use the cost savings to lower the price of aircrafts, win sales,
and unfairly increase its market share. 36 In its case against the European
Communities, the United States challenged seventy-one subsidies
provided to Airbus by various European Communities, including
France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 37 The challenged
subsidies include launch aid, “grants and government-provided goods
and services to develop, expand, and upgrade Airbus manufacturing
sites,” preferential loan terms, forgiveness of debt, and equity infusions,
among others.38 The European Communities’ case against the United
States challenges subsidies Boeing received from NASA, the
Department of Defense, and the states of Washington, Kansas, and
Illinois.39

II. THE GOVERNING LAW: AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
Since subsidies significantly affect market share in the aircraft
industry, both Boeing and Airbus desire some level of subsidy
figures: of 764 airlines that operate Airbus and/or Boeing aircraft, 645 operate
Boeing LCA, 507 operate only Boeing LCA, 119 operate only Airbus LCA.”).
34
Spadafore, supra note 23, at 33.
35
Id.
36
Background Fact Sheet: WTO disputes US/EU Large Civil Aircraft,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Jan. 31, 2011), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2010/september/tradoc_146486.pdf [hereinafter Background Fact Sheet].
37
DS316 WTO Panel Subsidy Findings – Win/Loss Analysis (2010), THE
BOEING
COMPANY,
http://www.boeing.com/aboutus/govt_ops/docs/wto/
Win_and_Loss_Analysis.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2011); Executive Summary,
supra note 24, at 1.
38
Executive Summary, supra note 24 at 1.
39
Background Fact Sheet, supra note 36, at 1.
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regulation. The body of law that governs subsidy disputes can be found
in the SCM Agreement. This agreement provides guidelines for
determining whether government funding in any industry is an
actionable or prohibited subsidy and how an actionable or prohibited
subsidy should be remedied.
The first step in the WTO’s analysis is to determine whether
government funding qualifies as a subsidy. 40 Under the SCM
Agreement, a subsidy is defined broadly as a “‘financial contribution’
that confers a ‘benefit’ on its recipient.”41 Thus, a subsidy exists if its
funding satisfies two criteria: (i) it must be a financial contribution to
the recipient, and (ii) it must confer a benefit on the recipient. 42 In a
prior WTO case, US – Softwood Lumber IV, the WTO appellate body
clarified that the “evaluation of the existence of a financial contribution
involves consideration of the nature of the transaction through which
something of economic value is transferred by a government” and that
“[a] wide range of transactions falls within the meaning of ‘financial
contribution.’”43 Furthermore, funding is deemed to confer a benefit on
a recipient when it is provided “on terms that are more advantageous
than those [terms] that would have been available to the recipient on

40

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 1, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
41
Executive Summary, supra note 24, at 9 (citing SCM Agreement,
supra note 40, art. 1.1 (stating “1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a
subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in
this Agreement as ‘government’), i.e. where: (i) a government practice involves
a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans and equity infusion), potential direct
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) government revenue
that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as
tax credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other than general
infrastructure, or purchases goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a
funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or
more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would
normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs
from practices normally followed by governments; or (a)(2) there is any form
of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994; and (b) a
benefit is thereby conferred.”)).
42
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1(B)(2)(a)(ii).
43
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.29 (emphasis added) (citing Appellate Body
Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, ¶ 52, WT/DS257/AB/RW (Dec. 5, 2005)).

172

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 8.1

the market.”44 Insight into the interpretation of this benefit requirement
is explained in WTO appellate precedent:
[T]he word ‘benefit,’ as used in Article 1.1(b),
implies some kind of comparison. This must be so,
for there can be no ‘benefit’ to the recipient unless
the ‘financial contribution’ makes the recipient
‘better off’ than it would otherwise have been, absent
that contribution. In our view, the marketplace
provides an appropriate basis for comparison in
determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred,’
because the trade-distorting potential of a ‘financial
contribution’ can be identified by determining
whether the recipient has received a ‘financial
contribution’ on terms more favourable than those
available to the recipient in the market.45
Precedent also demonstrates, however, that generally “the financial
contribution clearly confers a benefit, in as much as [the taxpayer] need
not pay certain taxes that would otherwise be due.” 46
This broad definition covers a number of contributions, including
the following contributions, which were challenged by the European
Communities in its WTO case against the United States: “direct and
potential direct transfers of funds . . . ; government revenue otherwise
due that is foregone or not collected . . . ; and provision of goods or
services other than general infrastructure . . . .” 47 Not all funding
satisfying the above criteria violates the SCM Agreement. Rather, a
subsidy is permitted under the SCM Agreement so long as the subsidy
in question is neither prohibited nor specific.48
A subsidy is prohibited if it falls under one of the forms listed in
Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.49 Prohibited subsidies include
44

Id. ¶ 7.114.
Id. ¶ 7.30 (emphasis added) (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Aircraft, ¶ 157, WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000)).
46
Id. ¶ 7.169 (citing Panel Report, US – FSC, ¶ 7.103, WT/DS108/R
(Oct. 8, 1999)).
47
Id. ¶ 7.26.
48
European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, supra note 4; SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1.2 (stating “A
subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or
shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is
specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.”).
49
Executive Summary, supra note 24, at 10.
45
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“subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of
several other conditions, upon export performance” and “subsidies
contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon
the use of domestic over imported goods.”50 To determine whether a
subsidy is prohibited in law, or de jure, the panel must focus solely on
the text of the legislative authority. 51 If a subsidy is prohibited in fact,
or de facto, the panel may consider circumstantial evidence. 52 WTO
precedent provides that de facto export contingency requires three
criteria: (i) a subsidy must be granted, (ii) which is tied to (iii) the
actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. 53 According to the
appellate body, “tied to” implies a “relationship of ‘conditionality or
dependence’” and may be rephrased as “contingent upon.” 54
Actionable but not prohibited subsidies fall under Article 2 of the
SCM Agreement. Generally, a subsidy is specific if its application is
explicitly limited to “an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or
industries.”55 According to prior WTO rulings, specificity analysis is
unique to each case:
At some point that is not made precise in the text of
the [SCM Agreement], and which may modulate
according to the particular circumstances of a given
case, a subsidy would cease to be specific because it
is sufficiently broadly available throughout an
economy as not to benefit a particular limited group
of producers of certain products. The plain words of
Article 2.1 indicate that specificity is a general
concept, and the breadth or narrowness of specificity
is not susceptible to rigid quantitative definition.

50

SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 3.1.
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1518.
52
Id.
53
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 3.1(a) n.4; Accord U.S. –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), supra
note 10, ¶ 7.1519 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, ¶ 169,
WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000)).
54
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1520.
55
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1.
51
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Whether a subsidy is specific can only be assessed on
a case-by-case basis.56
However, Article 2 outlines factors that may be considered to
determine whether a subsidy is specific. Factors to consider in
determining specificity include the “use of a subsidy programme by a
limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain
enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy
to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been
exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.”57
A subsidy that sets out objective criteria or conditions governing
eligibility is not specific.58
A specific subsidy is also actionable if it results in “adverse
effects” to the challenging party.59 The SCM Agreement provides that
“[N]o Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of
other Members."60 The term “adverse effects” is to be understood
within the meaning of Articles 5(a) and 5(c) of the SCM Agreement as
present61 “injury to the domestic industry of another member” and
“serious prejudice to the interest of another member.” 62 Under Section
6.3 of the SCM Agreement, “serious prejudice” occurs if the subsidy
can be linked to one or more of the following effects:
(i) displacement or impediment of imports into the subsidizing
member’s market,
(ii) displacement or impediment of exports of another member
into third country markets,

56

U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.31 (emphasis added) (citing Panel Report, US –
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 7.1142, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004)).
57
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(c).
58
Id. art. 2.1(b).
59
Executive Summary, supra note 24, at 2.
60
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 5.
61
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1654 (“Article 5 Adverse Effects: No Member
should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2
of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: (a) injury to
the domestic industry of another Member; (b) nullification or impairment of
benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in
particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; (c)
serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.”).
62
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 5(a), 5(c).
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(iii) significant price undercutting as compared to another member
in the same market or the generation of significant price
suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market,
or
(iv) an increase of world market share for a particular product of
the subsidized member after a subsidy is received compared to
the subsidized member’s average market share during the
previous 3 years.63
The panel in the Boeing case interpreted Article 6.3 to “require the
establishment of a causal link between the subsidies in question and the
particular form of serious prejudice.”64 However, because the Article
does not include the word “cause,” the panel reasoned that there is a
“certain degree of discretion in selecting an appropriate methodology
for determining whether the “effect” of a subsidy is any of the
phenomena set forth in Articles 6.3(a) through (d)” that the panel may
use in reaching its decisions.65 Accordingly, the panel made the
following proposal:

63

Id. art. 6.1-6.2 (“Article 6, Serious Prejudice: 6.1 Serious prejudice in
the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 shall be deemed to exist in the case of:
(a) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeding 5 per cent; (b)
subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry; (c) subsidies to
cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-time measures
which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that enterprise and which
are given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions
and to avoid acute social problems; (d) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e.
forgiveness of government-held debt, and grants to cover debt repayment.”).
64
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1656; See also, Panel Report, US –Subsidies on
Upland Cotton, ¶ 7.1341, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004); Appellate Body
Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), ¶ 372, WT/DS267/AB/RW
(June 2, 2008) (supporting this conclusion with the ordinary meaning of the
language in the Article as well as Article 5) (“Although Article 6.3 does not use
the word ‘cause’, the Panel considers that the sub-paragraphs of Article 6.3
require the establishment of a causal link between the subsidies in question and
the particular form of serious prejudice. This interpretation of Article 6.3
accords with the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘arise’ and ‘effect’, and finds
contextual support in Article 5(c) and Part V of the SCM Agreement. Article
5(c) provides that no Member should cause serious prejudice to the interests of
another Member through the use of any subsidy.“).
65
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1656 (citing Appellate Body Report, US –
Upland Cotton, ¶ 436 WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008)) (discussing the
approach to causation and non-attribution taken by the compliance panel in that
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The panel proposes to adopt a counterfactual
approach to determining whether the ‘effects’ of the
subsidies at issue in this dispute are displacement or
impedance, significant lost sales or significant price
suppression . . . first by examining the effects of the
subsidies on Boeing's LCA commercial behaviour
(i.e. Boeing's prices and product offerings) and
secondly by examining the effects of the subsidies,
through their effects on Boeing’s commercial
behaviour, on Airbus’ prices and sales in the specific
product markets.66
As part of this analysis, the panel will also consider “non-attribution”
factors to “ensure that the effects of other factors on prices do not dilute
the causal link between the subsidies and the price suppression.” 67 In
summary, the panel looks for a “genuine and substantial relationship of
cause and effect between the subsidy in question and the displacement
or impedance, significant lost sales, or significant price suppression.” 68
“Serious prejudice” is analyzed using a two prong test: (i) does the
evidence suggest that the effect of the subsidy falls into one of the
situations identified in Article 6.3(a) through (c), 69 and (ii) did the
specific subsidy cause these effects?70
Notwithstanding the above, Article 8 provides for the exception of
certain specific subsidies. Subsidies for research up to 75% of
dispute (in the context of a claim of significant price suppression)) (“[A] panel
has a certain degree of discretion in selecting an appropriate methodology for
determining whether the 'effect' of a subsidy is significant price suppression.”).
66
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1659.
67
Id. ¶ 7.1660 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), ¶ 375, WT/DS267AB/RW (June 2, 2008)).
68
Id. ¶ 7.1662.
69
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 6.3 (“Serious prejudice in the
sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or several
of the following apply: (a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the
imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing
Member; (b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a
like product of another Member from a third country market; (c) the effect of
the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as
compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same
market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the
same market.”).
70
European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, supra note 4.
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industrial costs or 50% of precompetitive development activity, as well
as subsidies aiding disadvantaged regions of the member’s territory,
will be deemed non-actionable notwithstanding evidence to the
contrary under Articles 3 through 7.71 A subsidy is also non-actionable
if the government or other granting authority “establishes objective
conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy . .
. provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and
conditions are strictly adhered to.”72

III. BOEING IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Despite the ongoing Airbus-Boeing Dispute currently before the
WTO, both parties are continuing operations, which includes accepting
new subsidies. One of the most recent subsidies to Boeing came from
the State of South Carolina in House Bill 3130 (“H.B. 3130”). 73
A. THE SOUTH CAROLINA INCENTIVES PACKAGE
House Bill 3130 amends South Carolina Code Section 12-6-2320,
Section 12-36-2120, and Sections 11-41-20 through 90. 74 This 2009
bill provides certain benefits for up to ten years to taxpayers who meet
two requirements. First, the taxpayer must invest at least $750 million
in real or personal property in a single county in South Carolina.
Second, the taxpayer must create at least 3,800 new and full-time jobs
within seven years.75 In return, the taxpayer receives income and sales
tax exemptions as well as economic development bonds.76
House Bill 3130 amended Section 12-6-2320 to expand the
definition of allowable arrangement for income tax reductions with
taxpayers.77 Prior to the bill, South Carolina could enter into
agreements with taxpayers under Section 12-6-2320(B)(3)(a) for up to
ten years if the taxpayer was:
[P]lanning a new facility in this State or an expansion
of an existing facility and the new or expanded
facility result[ed] in a total investment of at least ten
million dollars and the creation of at least two
71

SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 8.
Id. art. 2.1 (b).
73
H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
72
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hundred new full-time jobs, with an average cash
compensation level for the new jobs of more than
three times the per capita income of this State at the
time the jobs [were] filled which must [have been]
within five years.78
The amendment altered this section by adding Paragraph 3(a)(ii),
which provides for an alternative set of conditions under which the
State may enter into an agreement with a taxpayer if “the taxpayer is
planning a new facility in this State and invests at least seven hundred
fifty million dollars in real or personal property or both in a single
county in this State and creates at least three thousand eight hundred
full-time new jobs” within seven years. 79 The main changes in the
amendment are the increase in required investment from $10 million to
$750 million and the increase in required job creation from 200 to
3,800. These changes reflect the State’s anticipation of a significant
arrangement with a large corporation.
House Bill 3130 also amends Section 12-36-2120 by adding new
paragraphs that expand the current sales tax exemptions for aircraft
fuel, computer equipment, and construction materials.80 The sales tax
exemptions for aircraft fuel are covered in Paragraph 9(e) and (f). 81
This paragraph removes the sales tax from:
coal, or coke or other fuel sold to manufacturers,
electric power companies, and transportation
companies for . . . (e) the generation of motive power
for test flights of aircraft by the manufacturer of the
aircraft [and] (f) the transportation of an aircraft prior
to its completion from one facility of the
manufacturer of the aircraft to another facility of the
manufacturer of the aircraft, not including the
transportation of major component parts for
construction or assembly, or the transportation of
personnel.82
Under new Paragraph 65(b) of Section 12-36-2120, the sales tax
exemption is expanded to broadly cover “computer equipment” used at

78

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2320 (2008).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320(B)(3) (2010).
80
H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009).
81
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2190(9)(e)-(f).
82
Id.
79
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Boeing’s expanded North Charleston plant. 83 “Computer equipment” is
defined in Section (65)(c) as follows:
original or replacement servers, routers, switches,
power units, network devices, hard drives,
processors, memory modules, motherboards, racks,
other computer hardware and components, cabling,
cooling apparatus, and related or ancillary equipment,
machinery, and components, the primary purpose of
which is to store, retrieve, aggregate, search,
organize, process, analyze, or transfer data or any
combination of these, or to support related computer
engineering or computer science research.84
Lastly, construction materials are exempted in amended Section
12-36-2120(67).85 House Bill 3130 amended this section to include in
the existing exemption for construction materials an exemption for
“construction materials used in the construction of a new or expanded
single manufacturing facility.”86
Each of the tax incentives is linked to a claw-back provision. 87
Under these provisions, the State is allowed to “assess any tax due as a
result of the taxpayer’s failure to meet the requirements.” 88 These
provisions protect the State in the chance that Boeing does not meet
and maintain the investment or employment levels required by the code
amendments.
House Bill 3130 also amends numerous sections of the State
General Obligation Economic Development Bond Act, which permits
the issuance of economic development bonds under certain
circumstances.89 More specifically, these economic development
bonds, more formally known as “state general obligation development

83

Id. § 12-36-2120(65)(b).
Id.
85
Id. § 12-36-2120(67).
86
Id.
87
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BOEING IN SOUTH CAROLINA, MILEY &
ASSOCIATES, INC. 11 (2010), available at http://scfuture.org/wp-content/
uploads/2010/05/Economic-Impact-of-Boeing.pdf.
88
See generally H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-6-2320(B)(4) (2010); See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-36-2120(9),
(65)(e), (67) (2010).
89
S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-40 (2010).
84
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bonds,” are limited in application to “financing for infrastructure,” 90
which includes:
land acquisition, site preparation, road and highway
improvements, rail spur construction, water service,
wastewater treatment, employee training which may
include equipment used for such purpose,
environmental mitigation, training and research
facilities and the necessary equipment therefore,
buildings and renovations to buildings whether new
or existing (i) associated with an economic
development project as defined in Section 11-4130(2) that includes air carrier hub terminal facilities
as defined in Section 55-11-500(a), or (ii) located on
land that is owned by the State or an agency,
instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof.91
A total of $270 million was approved to incentivize Boeing to
expand its plant in South Carolina.92 Of this amount, $220 million
were approved as general obligation bonds. 93 Typically, the amount of
general obligation debt94 that the State of South Carolina may incur is
limited annually to a certain percentage of the general revenues of the
state for the previous year.95 However, there is no numerical ceiling on
the amount of general obligation debt that may be authorized by a twothirds vote of the members of each House of the General Assembly, 96
so long as the debt is incurred for a public purpose. 97 Further support
for this unlimited indebtedness may be found in Article 5 of the South
Carolina Constitution:
[i]f general obligation debt be authorized by (a) twothirds of the members of each House of the General
Assembly; or (b) by a majority vote of the qualified
electors of the State voting in a referendum called by
the General Assembly there shall be no conditions or
restrictions limiting the incurring of such
90

Id.
Id. § 11-41-30(3)(a)-(j) (emphasis added).
92
Project Gemini Agreement, Boeing Company-South Carolina, Jan. 1,
2010, 3 (on file with author) [hereinafter Project Gemini Agreement].
93
Id.
94
This excludes highway bonds, state institution bonds, tax anticipation
notes, and bond anticipation notes.
95
See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-20 (2010).
96
Id. § 11-41-20 (5).
97
S.C. Const. art. X, §13(3).
91
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indebtedness except (i) those restrictions and
limitations imposed in the authorization to incur such
indebtedness, and (ii) the provisions of subsection (3)
hereof [requiring a public purpose]. 98
Pursuant to Section 13(5) of Article X of the Constitution, House
Bill 3130 amended South Carolina Code Section 11-41-50(B)99 to
allow for economic development bonds up to an aggregate principal of
$170 million.100 The remainder of the economic bonds were authorized
as follows: $40 million of general obligation bonds, subject to the
maximum annual debt limit, reallocated from a previous project
pursuant to Section 11-41-50(A),101 (ii) an additional $10 million
98

Id. § 13(5).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-50(B) (2010) (“In addition to and exclusive of
the economic development bonds provided for and issued pursuant to
subsection (A) of this section, the General Assembly provides that pursuant
to Section 13(5), Article X of the Constitution of this State, 1895, (i) additional
economic development bonds may be issued under this chapter in an aggregate
principal amount that does not exceed one hundred seventy million dollars, and
(ii) in addition to the authorization contained in the preceding clause, additional
economic development bonds may be issued provided that the aggregate
principal amount of economic development bonds then outstanding under
clauses (i) and (ii), together with the economic development bonds to be issued
pursuant to this clause (ii), does not at any time exceed the principal amount
specified in clause (i). From the proceeds of the economic development bonds
authorized pursuant to this subsection, no more than a total of one hundred
seventy million dollars of proceeds may be used for any one project regardless
of available capacity.”).
100
Id. (“(i) additional economic development bonds may be issued under
this chapter in an aggregate principal amount that does not exceed one hundred
seventy million dollars, and (ii) in addition to the authorization contained in the
preceding clause, additional economic development bonds may be issued
provided that the aggregate principal amount of economic development bonds
then outstanding under clauses (i) and (ii), together with the economic
development bonds to be issued pursuant to this clause (ii), does not at any time
exceed the principal amount specified in clause (i).”).
101
Letter from Joe Taylor, Secretary of the Department of Commerce, to
the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board, (Jan. 8, 2010) (on file with
author); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-50(A) (2010) (“Pursuant to Section 13(6)(c),
Article X of the Constitution of this State, 1895, the General Assembly
provides that economic development bonds may be issued pursuant to this
subsection at such times as the maximum annual debt service on all general
obligation bonds of the State, including economic development bonds
outstanding and being issued, but excluding research university infrastructure
bonds pursuant to Chapter 51 of this title, highway bonds, state institution
bonds, tax anticipation notes, and bond anticipation notes, will not exceed five
99
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authorized under the same Section,102 and (iii) $50 million authorized
as Air Carrier Bonds under the Air Carrier Hub Terminal Facilities Act
codified in Section 55-11-520(A), in return for which Boeing
committed itself to operate the air carrier hub facility. 103
In addition to the state provided benefits, Boeing also receives
local incentives. One of the more significant incentives provided by
Charleston County is the Fee-In-Lieu-of-Tax (“FILOT”)104 codified in
Chapter 44 of Title 12 of the South Carolina Code. FILOT is an
incentive mechanism that reduces property taxes for new or expanding
businesses.105 Boeing’s investment is locked in to an assessment rate of
4%, a rate significantly lower than the standard industrial property
assessment rate of 10.5%.106 At this rate, Boeing will pay taxes at a
fixed millage rate of 269.8 mills over the thirty year term. 107
and one-half percent of the general revenues of the State for the fiscal year next
preceding, excluding revenues which are authorized to be pledged for state
highway bonds and state institution bonds. The State at any time may not issue
general obligation bonds, excluding economic development bonds issued
pursuant to this chapter, research university infrastructure bonds issued
pursuant to Chapter 51 of this title, highway bonds, state institution bonds, tax
anticipation notes, and bond anticipation notes, if at the time of issuance the
maximum annual debt service on all such general obligation bonds, outstanding
and being issued exceeds five percent of the general revenues of the State for
the fiscal year next preceding, excluding revenues which are authorized to be
pledged for state highway bonds and state institution bonds.”).
102
Letter from Joe Taylor, supra note 101, at 2.
103
Project Gemini Agreement, supra note 92, at 3; S.C. CODE ANN. §
55-11-520(A) (2010) (“Pursuant to the provisions of subsection 6(c), Section
13, Article 10 of the Constitution of this State, in order to provide funds to pay
a portion of the costs of (1) acquiring land, (2) constructing, enlarging,
improving, extending, renovating, and equipping suitable air carrier hub
terminal facilities to be located in this State, (3) purchasing equipment, ground
support equipment, machinery, special tools, maintenance, boarding facilities,
and any and all additional necessary real or personal property for the operation
of air carrier hub terminal facilities, and (4) if petitioned by a special purpose
district or other political subdivision of the State, to pay a portion or all of the
costs described in Section 55-11-510, not exceeding fifty million dollars of
general obligation bonds of this State, to be outstanding at any time may be
issued in the manner provided in this article and by law.”).
104
Project Gemini Agreement, supra note 92, at 3, 13.
105
Id. at 3.
106
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-44-50 (2010); Project Gemini Agreement, supra
note 92, at 3.
107
Charleston County Financial Incentives for The Boeing Company
Final Assembly Project, CHARLESTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT ONLINE (2010),
http://www.charlestoncounty.org/departments/council/Boeing
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Charleston County also offered Boeing Special Source Revenue Credits
(SSRC) under South Carolina Code Section 4-29-68.108 As a result, for
the first fifteen years of the FILOT program, a 50% credit will be
applied.109 In other words, 50% of the revenue from the FILOT
payments is returned to Boeing during the first fifteen years, essentially
reducing Boeing’s assessment rate to 2%. 110 Charleston County
estimates that the FILOT program will raise $138.6 million over the
course of thirty years, representing 74% of Boeing’s payments. 111 The
remaining 26%, or $49.8 million, is returned to Boeing. 112
In addition to the FILOT, Boeing also received a Multi-County
Industrial Park designation under South Carolina Code Section 4-1175. As a result of this designation, Boeing was qualified to receive the
SSRC. This designation also allowed Boeing to use job tax credits to
offset state corporate income taxes and qualified it for a Set-Aside and
Utility Credit Grant, which included $5 million for site preparation
costs, $150,000 for a traffic study, and $100,000 for public
infrastructure.113

B. LEGALITY OF THE INCENTIVES UNDER THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION’S SCM AGREEMENT
The question of whether South Carolina’s incentives are illegal
subsidies under the WTO should be answered in light of the most
recent WTO panel ruling on the Boeing case, the European
Communities’ case against the United States filed as part of the AirbusBoeing dispute. Accordingly, the following analysis will mirror the
analytical process implemented by the panel and apply the terms of the
SCM Agreement in accord with their application in the Boeing case.

FinancialIncentives1-12-10.pdf [hereinafter Charleston County Financial
Incentives].
108
Id.
109
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BOEING IN SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note
87, at 13.
110
Charleston County Financial Incentives, supra note 107.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
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WHETHER A SUBSIDY EXISTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1
OF THE SCM AGREEMENT

In analyzing the legality of South Carolina’s incentive package
under the SCM Agreement, the first determination must be whether
each incentive individually qualifies as a subsidy as defined in Article 1
of the SCM Agreement. As discussed in depth above, a subsidy is
defined as a financial contribution in the form of either foregone
government revenue otherwise due, or a direct transfer of funds, in each
case that confer a benefit on the recipient.114
The South Carolina tax exemptions would most likely qualify as a
subsidy because the tax rate reductions provide a financial contribution
that confers a benefit on the recipient. The reduction in tax rate is
clearly not a direct transfer of funds; however, the sales tax rate
reductions for certain applications of aircraft fuel, computer equipment,
and construction materials provided to Boeing may constitute foregone
government revenue otherwise due. The panel’s previous interpretation
of these requirements suggests that the tax rate provided in the
incentives package should be contrasted against the general “tax rules
applied by the Member in question.” 115 If a member state has a general
rule of taxation, the analysis is a but-for test: government revenue is
otherwise due where the company would have to pay a certain amount
of money to the government but for the incentives.116 Where a general
rate of taxation is difficult to define, the panel has acknowledged that it
looks to “the fiscal treatment of legitimately comparable income to
determine whether the contested measure involves the foregoing of
revenue which is ‘otherwise due.’”117
There is a general rate of taxation in South Carolina. In South
Carolina, the sales and use tax is set state- and industry-wide at 6%,
with an additional 1% in certain local governments. 118 However, the
legislation has carved out certain exclusions for manufacturers. South
Carolina
Regulation
117-302,
Manufacturers,
Processors,
Compounders, Miners and Quarries, points to several exclusions in

114

SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1.1.
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.116.
116
Id. ¶ 7.118.
117
Id. ¶ 7.119.
118
Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-910 (2010) (providing a 5% rate),
and S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-1110 (2010) (adding an additional 1% to the
general rate, “penny tax”), with U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.709.
115
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Code Section 12-36-120 and exemptions in Code Section 12-362120.119 Section 12-36-120 excludes from the state sales statutes the
sale of “tangible personal property to a manufacturer or compounder as
an ingredient or component part of the tangible personal property or
products manufactured or compounded for sale” and “tangible personal
property used directly120 in manufacturing, compounding, or processing
tangible personal property into products for sale.” 121 Furthermore,
Section 12-36-2120, discussed in depth above, provides specific sales
tax exemptions, into which exemptions in subsections (9)(e) and (f),
(65) and (67) were inserted as part of the Boeing deal. 122
Because the tax rate exemptions provide an exceptional rate that
requires Boeing to pay less in taxes, the tax exemptions likely qualify
as a financial contribution. South Carolina Regulation 117-302,
“[m]anufacturers . . . enjoy several exclusions and exemptions from the
sales and use taxes,” suggests that these exemptions are at a preferential
or exceptional rate.123
The exceptional treatment of the incentives such as aircraft fuel,
computers, and construction materials in Code Section 12-36-2120 is
119

S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 117-302 (2011).
Id. at 117-302.1 (“[B]y ‘used directly’ is meant that the materials or
products so used come in direct contact with and contribute to bring about
some chemical or physical change in the ingredient or component properties
during the period in which the fabricating, converting or processing takes place.
It is not necessary that such materials or products be used up or entirely
consumed, provided there is a compliance with the requirements set forth
herein. These exclusions apply to: (a) odorants purchased by gas companies
and used in compounding gas for sale.(b) chemicals, such as soda, ash, alum,
chlorine, etc., used in treating water for sale by municipalities and others
engaged in the business of processing or compounding water for sale.(c)
refrigerants used by manufacturers to produce ice for sale.(d) acetylene,
oxygen, and other gases sold to manufacturers or compounders which enter into
and become an ingredient or component part of the tangible personal property
or products which he manufactures or compounds for sale, or which are used
directly in fabricating, converting, or processing the materials or products being
manufactured or compounded for sale.(e) plates attached by the manufacturer
to his product for identification purposes and which become a part of the
product. These exclusions do not apply to sales of acetylene, oxygen, and other
gases for use by repairman, welders, dentists, junk dealers, and others are
subject to the sales or use tax, whichever applies.”).
121
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-120(2)-(3) (2010).
122
See id. § 12-36-120; S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2120(9), (65) (2010).
123
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 117-302 (2011) (emphasis added); Cf. U.S. –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), supra
note 10, ¶ 7.126.
120
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further highlighted by the language in South Carolina Regulation 117302, which specifically differentiates between “exclusions” and
“exemptions.”124 Whereas the broader “exclusions” in Section 12-3120 fall outside the sales tax statute’s applicability, the “exemptions”
fall within the statute, but are released from the obligation. The nature
of exemptions themselves implies that if the exemptions were repealed,
the items exempted from sales tax would otherwise fall under the
general rule of taxation and the revenue from tax on those items would
be realized by the State as increased revenue.
Likewise, the FILOT agreement between Boeing and the County
of Charleston and the related SSRC would also qualify as subsidies
because the property tax fee, which Boeing has agreed to pay in lieu of
certain local property taxes, and which is further reduced by the SSRC,
constitutes a financial contribution that confers a benefit. Under
Section 12-43-220(a), “[a]ll real and personal property owned by or
leased to manufacturers and utilities and used by the manufacturer or
utility in the conduct of the business must be taxed on an assessment
equal to ten and one-half percent of the fair market value of the
property.”125 However, under the FILOT agreement, Boeing is locked
in at a 4% assessment rate. 126 This assessment rate is further reduced
by the SSRC, pursuant to which 50% of the FILOT payments are
credited to Boeing for the first fifteen years. 127 Thus, Boeing’s
assessment rate for property taxes in Charleston is 2% for the first
fifteen years and 4% for years fifteen through thirty. In saving up to
8.5% in property taxes, Boeing is receiving a preferential fee in lieu of
the standard taxation rate of 10.5% in return for its investment in
Charleston.
Furthermore, the terminology of the Fee Agreement between
Boeing and Charleston County confirms the conclusion that the FILOT
124

S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 117-302 (2011) (“The exclusions can be found
in Code Section 12-36-120 and includes containers, ingredients and component
parts, and items used directly in manufacturing, compounding or processing
tangible personal property for sale. The exemptions can be found in Code
Section 12-36-2120 and include exemptions for coal, coke, fuel, electricity, and
machines.”).
125
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-43-220(a)(1) (2010), amended effective Jan. 1,
2011.
126
Fee Agreement, by and between Charleston County, South Carolina
and The Boeing Company, CHARLESTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT ONLINE, § 5.2
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.charlestoncounty.org/departments /council/Boeing
FeeAgreementWithChasCounty.pdf.
127
Id. § 1.1(b)(9)(c).
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is an exceptional rate compared to the general rate of taxation. In
Section 2.2 of the Fee Agreement, Charleston County and Boeing agree
that Boeing shall be exempt from ad valorem property taxes in the state
and in return, Boeing is obligated to pay a fee at a lower rate. 128 The
agreement itself compares the preferential rate to the rate agreed to in
the FILOT agreement, referring in multiple sections to “property taxes
that would be due with respect to such property, if it were taxable” and
“if it were otherwise subject to ad valorem taxes.”129 Furthermore, the
parties to the agreement acknowledge in Section 5.4 that the agreement
is intended “to afford Boeing the benefits . . . in consideration of
Boeing’s decision to locate the Project within the County,” further
evidencing the financial contribution being afforded to Boeing by the
FILOT agreement.130
The Economic Development Bonds are also a subsidy under
Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement. Neither Washington,
Illinois, nor Kansas provided general obligation bonds to Boeing
similar to those provided by South Carolina. However, the analysis
implemented by the panel regarding Kansas Development Finance
Authority Bonds (KDFA bonds) provides valuable insight into how the
SCM Agreement would apply to general obligation bonds. Kansas
legislation provided up to $500 million in bonds to Boeing as “an
eligible business for an eligible project” so long as Boeing (i) paid at
least $600 million in average gross compensation, (ii) paid at least
$50,000 average annual compensation per employee, (iii) invested at
least $1 billion in real or tangible personable property in Kansas, and
(iv) operated in the manufacturing sector during the three taxable years
immediately preceding application for benefits. 131 An eligible business
must repay these funds with interest, but payments are made from an
account in which the income taxes withheld from the eligible
business’s employees are deposited.132 The panel determined the bonds
were a subsidy in the form of a direct transfer of funds. 133 Because, in
this case, the eligible business owns its own bonds, the business

128

Id. § 2.2, 5.1(a). South Carolina does not collect property taxes at the
state level. Instead, property taxes are collected by individual counties.
129
Id. § 5.1(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
130
Id. § 5.4.
131
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.822-7.823 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7450,136 (2004)).
132
Id. ¶ 7.824.
133
Id. ¶ 7.832.
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essentially receives a direct grant from Kansas in the amount of the
interest due on the bonds.134
Just as the net effect of the KDFA bond issuances was a grant, the
net effect of the development bonds is also a direct transfer of funds in
the form of a grant.135 Although Boeing will pay rent for the property
(which is owned by the state), Boeing is under no obligation to repay
the development bonds.136 Furthermore, Boeing pays no tax upon
receipt of the bonds, and the interest on the bonds is paid by the
State.137 Essentially, Boeing received an infrastructure-related grant in
the amount of the economic development. Therefore, the general
obligation bonds from South Carolina constitute a financial
contribution in the form of a direct transfer of funds.
The development bonds also confer a benefit on Boeing. With
respect to direct transfers of funds, a benefit is conferred when the
company “received a financial contribution more favourable than that
available on the market.”138 The panel found that the financial
contribution from the KDFA bonds was more favorable than market
terms because the bonds required neither loan repayment nor interest
payments.139 According to the panel, “on the marketplace, any such
transfer of funds would be accompanied by a requirement that the sum
be repaid with interest.”140 Furthermore, precedent provides that
“financial contributions in the form of grants confer a benefit.” 141
According to the panel’s reasoning in the Boeing case ruling,
where a tax measure “constitutes a financial contribution, a benefit is
conferred.”142 Thus, in qualifying as either government revenue
otherwise due but foregone or a direct transfer of funds, and in
conferring a benefit, the South Carolina sales tax exemptions, FILOT
agreement, and general obligation bond incentives more than likely all
qualify as subsidies under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
134

Id. ¶ 7.827.
See id. ¶ 7.827.
136
See generally State General Obligation Economic Development Act,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-10 to -180 (2010).
137
Id.
138
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.834 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000)).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. ¶ 7.171.
135
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WHETHER THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUBSIDIES ARE SPECIFIC WITHIN
THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT?

However, not all subsidies violate the SCM Agreement; it only
prohibits specific subsidies. As discussed above, Article 2 provides
that a subsidy is specific if the “granting authority, or the legislation
pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits
access to a subsidy to ‘certain enterprises’” in either the text of the
granting legislation or in other statements and expressions of intent by
the granting authority.143 In the recent Boeing case, the panel focused
on the term “explicitly,” interpreting it to mean that the “limitation
must ‘distinctly express all that is meant; leaving nothing merely
implied or suggested.’”144 While the panel clarified that the limitation
must be “‘unambiguous’ and ‘clear,’” it also acknowledged that “there
is some tipping point, which varies on a case-by-case basis, at which
access to the subsidy in issue is no longer considered limited to ‘certain
enterprises’ but rather is ‘sufficiently broadly available’ throughout an
economy so as to be non-specific.”145 A subsidy is not specific,
however, if the granting authority outlines objective standards that
automatically determine whether a taxpayer is eligible for the subsidy,
and if so, how much the subsidy would be.146
In analyzing the specificity of the Washington incentives, the
panel began with a de jure inspection of Washington House Bill 2294,
the granting authority.147 This de jure inspection, according to the
panel in the Boeing case ruling, analyzes the incentives in light of the
respective code as a whole, rather than relying solely on the language
of the amending legislation.148 Thus, the specificity analysis of the
South Carolina incentives will likewise begin with a de jure inspection,
during which the limitation placed on the incentives’ applicability will
be considered in light of the entire code section in which the incentives
are found.
With respect to the sales and use tax exemptions for fuel provided
by House Bill 3130, the language of the amended law creates de jure
specificity. The language of Sections 12-36-2120(9)(e) and (f)
143
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Id. ¶ 7.190.
145
Id. ¶¶ 7.190 - 91 (citing Panel Report, US –Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004)).
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SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(b).
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explicitly limits the tax measures to the aerospace industry. 149 For
example, Section (9)(e) expands the sales tax exemption for coal, coke
or other fuel sold to manufacturers to cover “the generation of motive
power for transportation of aircraft by the manufacturer of the
aircraft.”150 Likewise, Section (9)(f) provides a similar exemption for
“the transportation of an aircraft prior to its completion from one
facility of the manufacturer of the aircraft to another facility of the
manufacturer of the aircraft.”151 The applicability of each of the above
sections is limited to the “manufacturer of the aircraft,” 152 which, like
similar limitations in Washington House Bill 2294, qualifies the
incentives as “expressly and unambiguously limited to enterprises
manufacturing commercial airplanes.”153 According to the panel in the
Boeing case decision, a subsidy will be considered as limited to certain
enterprises if it is limited to a certain industry. 154 Such a limitation may
come about by a reference to “the types of products [the industry]
produces.”155 Therefore, because the sales tax exemptions for fuel are
limited to the aerospace industry, the sales tax exemption incentives
will likely be considered de jure specific under the SCM Agreement.
A de jure analysis of the remaining sales tax exemptions for
computer equipment and construction materials leads to a different
conclusion. The sections providing these exemptions contain more
general language and refer only to manufacturing facilities. 156 Neither
section suggests a limited application to the aerospace industry nor
does either limit the applicability to certain enterprises. 157 Therefore,
these two sections will not likely be considered de jure specific within
the meaning of Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement.
While all three of these sections appear in Section 12-36-2120,
which contains subsidies relating to various industries including
mining, quarrying, and farming, 158 the panel noted in its analysis of the
similar tax incentives of Washington House Bill 2294 that any
preferential rate provided to other industries, whether in the same code
149

S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2120(9)(e), (f) (2010).
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Id. § 12-36-2120(9)(f) (emphasis added).
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section or elsewhere, constitutes possible “separate specific subsidies to
the industries concerned.”159 Consequently, unless evidence was
provided demonstrating “that reductions to separate industries are part
of a wider, generally available and explicit programme of tax
reductions,” the sales tax exemption for fuel, but not the other two
exemptions or the income tax reduction, is de jure specific. 160
In fact, the remaining sales tax exemptions for computer hardware
and construction materials most likely qualify as non-specific under
Article 2.1(b), which provides that subsidies with objective eligibility
conditions are non-specific. The notes to this article of the SCM
Agreement define objective criteria or conditions as being “neutral . . .
not favor[ing] certain enterprises over others, and . . . economic in
nature and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or
size of enterprise.”161 These “conditions must be clearly spelled out in
law” and strictly applied.162 South Carolina has arguably passed this
threshold. The language of both exemptions limits the incentives’
application to use by a manufacturing facility, where “(i) the taxpayer
invests at least seven hundred fifty million dollars in real or personal
property or both comprising or located at the facility over a seven-year
period; and (ii) the taxpayer creates at least three thousand eight
hundred full-time new jobs at the facility during that seven-year
period.”163 South Carolina’s legislation lays out criteria for eligibility
that is arguably objective, namely the minimum requirement of $750
million capital investment and creation of 3,800 new full-time jobs.
Pending notification to the state, eligibility is automatic.164
Furthermore, the state expressly retains the right to collect any tax due
if the taxpayer fails to meet the mandatory, minimum requirements. 165
However, the eligibility requirements arguably fail the objectivity test
in that the investment and job creation requirements are so demanding
that they essentially exclude all but a certain few large enterprises like
Boeing. Nevertheless, cut-off standards are inherent in any eligibility
requirement and the line must be drawn somewhere.
However, despite passing the de jure specificity test under Article
2.1(a) and qualifying as de jure non-specific under Article 2.1(b), the
159
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.204.
160
Id. ¶ 7.205.
161
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(b) n.2.
162
Id. art. 2.1(b).
163
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2120(9)(f) (2010).
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Id.
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exemptions may still be found de facto specific under Article 2.1(c) of
the SCM Agreement. According to the panel in the Boeing case, even
if a subsidy is de jure non-specific under Article 2.1(b), the subsidy
may nevertheless “be found de facto specific under Article 2.1(c) of the
SCM Agreement.”166 Article 2.1(c) provides catch-all factors that may
be considered when a subsidy appears specific despite having qualified
as non-specific pursuant to Article 2.1(a) and (b).167 As noted above,
these factors include the “use of a subsidy programme by a limited
number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises,
the granting of disproportionately large amounts of the subsidy to
certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been
exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a
subsidy.”168
The income tax reduction and the computer hardware and
construction materials sales tax exemptions are most likely de facto
specific within the meaning of Article 2.1(c). Although other
manufacturing companies, such as BMW Manufacturing Company
(which currently operates a plant in South Carolina), possess the
financial means to surpass the investment and job creation thresholds if
they were to expand operations in the state, Boeing is the predominant
user of these subsidies. In fact, circumstances suggest that these tax
exemptions were enacted with Boeing in mind. More specifically,
these exemptions were passed in the same amending legislation as the
Boeing-related general obligation bonds, for which former Secretary of
the Department of Commerce, Joe Taylor, advocated in his January 8,
2010 letter to the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board “for
the benefit of The Boeing Company.” 169 The timing of the amending
legislation’s passage, which adds exemptions explicitly related to the
166
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.339 (citing Response of the United States to
Question 145, U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), ¶ 128, WT/DS353 (March 22, 2007)).
167
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(c) ("If, notwithstanding any
appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the principles
laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the
subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered. Such factors
are: use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises,
predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large
amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion
has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a
subsidy.").
168
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(c).
169
Letter from Joe Taylor, supra note 101.
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aerospace industry, also coincided with negotiations between Boeing
and the State of South Carolina, strongly suggesting a relationship
between the two actions. In the alternative, it is highly likely the panel
would find that Boeing makes either the predominate or a
disproportionally large use of these sales tax exemptions “consider[ing]
the extent of diversification of economic activities within the
jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as the length of time
during which the subsidy programme has been in operation.” 170
Although the legislation is relatively new, the subsidy’s high
investment and job creation requirements exclude the majority of
taxpayers and narrows the pool of eligible taxpayers to a much smaller
group of large enterprises, such as Boeing. If other enterprises are
unable to achieve the investment and job creation threshold, a
disproportionately large amount of the subsidy would be devoted to
Boeing. Thus, the potential that House Bill 3130 violates the
restrictions in Article 2.1 against the “use of a subsidy programme by a
limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain
enterprises [and] the granting of disproportionately large amounts of
subsidy to certain enterprises,”171 is quite high.
The FILOT tax reductions from Charleston County are likewise
also de facto specific. The granting authority, South Carolina Code
Section 12-44-40, is broadly drafted so as not to explicitly limit its
application to a certain enterprise, which protects the incentive from de
jure specificity. However, when combined with the related SSRC,
Boeing receives a disproportionately large amount of subsidization.
Not only does Boeing benefit from a lower assessment rate and a low
fixed millage rate, but it is also rebated 50% of its payments for the first
fifteen years, a subsidy valued at $53 million. 172
The economic development bonds are likely de facto specific for
similar reasons. While the amending legislation does not explicitly
refer to Boeing, the aerospace industry, or even the manufacturing
sector, the subsidy is also predominantly used by Boeing. Section 1141-50(B) allows for “additional economic development bonds . . . in an
aggregate principal amount that does not exceed one hundred seventy
million dollars.”173 Boeing received the maximum $170 million
allowable under this Section. Therefore, Boeing has received a
170

U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.752.
171
SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(c).
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The Economic Impact of Boeing in South Carolina, supra note 87, at
13.
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disproportionally large amount of the subsidy, which may not be
utilized to the benefit of any other corporation.

3.

WHETHER THE SOUTH CAROLINA INCENTIVES ARE PROHIBITED
SUBSIDIES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE SCM
AGREEMENT?

To determine whether the South Carolina incentives are
prohibited subsidies, the panel would have to decide whether the South
Carolina incentives are contingent, either in law or in fact, on export
performance.174 The verbiage of the subsidy does not indicate a de jure
export contingency or favoring of domestic goods, so the analysis will
focus on de facto contingency. A subsidy is de facto export contingent
where “the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without
having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in
fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.” 175
However, just because the recipient of a subsidy exports products does
not automatically qualify the subsidy as export contingent. 176 In prior
cases, de facto contingency was found where the repayment terms for
financing of “high-technology projects in the Canadian regional aircraft
sector” were tied directly to sales of the aircrafts. 177 In applying Article
3.1(a), the panel focused on the word “contingent.” 178 The panel
explained, de facto export contingency “must be inferred from the total
configuration of facts constituting and surrounding the granting of the
subsidy, none of which on its own is likely to be decisive in any
case.”179
Under these standards, the South Carolina legislation is most
likely not export contingent. In the current panel ruling, the business
and occupation tax breaks from Washington, in conjunction with
certain federal subsidies, were found to cause serious prejudice by
means of “displacement and impedance of European Communities,
exports from third country markets within the meaning of Article 6.3(b)
174

SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 3.1.
Id. art. 3.1 n.4.
176
Id.
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U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1517.
178
Id. ¶ 7.1518.
179
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of
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of the SCM Agreement” with respect to the 100-200 and 300-400 seat
product markets, “and significant price suppression and significant lost
sales within the meaning of Article 6.3(c) in [those] product
market[s].”180 The European Communities challenged the Washington
state business and occupation tax reductions as measures intended to
decrease marginal costs per aircraft, alleging the reduced cost led to
serious prejudice against Airbus.181 The panel rephrased the issue as
follows: “[W]hether the availability of . . . B&O tax subsidies enabled
Boeing to compete on price in individual sales, and secure sales that it
would not otherwise have made, and where it did not win those sales,
led to Airbus securing those sales at lower prices than it would
otherwise have obtained.”182 In reaching its conclusion, the panel
referred to US – Upland Cotton, in which the panel called for an
“integrated examination of the effects of any subsidies with a sufficient
nexus to the subsidized product and the particular effects-related
variable under consideration” under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c). 183 The
panel recognized that the business and occupation tax reductions, in
combination with certain other federal subsidies, “enabled Boeing to
lower its prices beyond the level that would otherwise have been
economically justifiable, and that in some cases . . . it led to Airbus
being able to secure the sale only at a reduced price.”184 The European
Communities also argued, although the panel rejected this claim, that
the Washington legislation was export contingent because it required
Boeing to build a minimum of thirty-six aircrafts, which it argued was
more than could be sold in the United States alone.185 The European
Communities, therefore, claimed that the subsidy is arguably
contingent on Boeing exporting whatever number of planes it could not
sell domestically. 186
The economic requirements of capital investment and job creation
used by South Carolina do not present the same ties to exportation.
180
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First, the magnitude of South Carolina’s incentives does not cause the
same price suppression concerns as the combined Washington and
federal subsidies. The panel estimated the combined value of the
Washington B&O and federal subsidies at $2,213,800,000, of which
amount $2.2 billion is attributable to the federal subsidies. 187 By
contrast, the entire South Carolina incentive package has been
estimated at $470 million.188 This is only a 21% share of the
Washington and federal subsidies.189
Although the cost of
development may discount slightly, it is unlikely that this amount will
significantly suppress the cost of aircraft. Furthermore, there is also no
minimum aircraft requirement and the investment requirements do not
indirectly support exports. As mentioned above, “the mere fact that a
subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason
alone be considered to be an export subsidy.” 190 Therefore, although
Boeing does export aircraft, this fact is also not determinative of export
contingency. Considering these facts, South Carolina’s incentives do
not appear tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings
and are therefore not prohibited.

4. WHETHER SOUTH CAROLINA CAUSES, THROUGH THE USE OF THE
SUBSIDIES, ADVERSE EFFECTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 5(C) OF
THE SCM AGREEMENT?
The next step in the panel’s analysis would be an evaluation of
whether any specific subsidy caused adverse effects to the challenging
member state. In past WTO cases, including the Boeing case, price
undercutting has been proven “through a comparison of prices of the
subsidized product with prices of a similar non-subsidized product
supplied to the same market.”191 This comparison is made “at the same
level of trade and at comparable times” or, if impossible, through a

187
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188
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comparison of export unit prices.192 Under the second prong, the panel
decides whether these effects were caused by the specific subsidies.
In the Boeing decision, the panel examined “whether
Washington’s B&O tax breaks positioned Boeing to (i) compete on
price in individual sales, and secure sales that it would not otherwise
have made,” or (ii) “where it did not win those sales, led to Airbus
securing those sales at lower prices than it would otherwise have
obtained.”193 Such a situation could occur because the B&O tax
subsidies serve to either decrease the marginal unit cost or increase
Boeing’s non-operating cash flow.194 Whether the panel looks at the
marginal unit cost or the non-operating cash flow depends on the nature
of the subsidy: “[W]e consider it axiomatic that the nature of the
United States subsidies at issue—in terms of their structure, design and
operation—is relevant in assessing whether or not they have price
suppressing effects.”195 Subsidies that are directly related to the
production or sale of an aircraft require an analysis of the marginal unit
cost, whereas subsidies that do not directly relate to the production or
sale of an aircraft require an analysis of the non-operating cash flow.196
The majority of the South Carolina subsidies would fall into the
latter category with the exception of the South Carolina tax measures,
which closely mirror the Washington B&O incentives and would likely
meet the same fate as the B&O tax measures. The panel labeled it an
“inescapable” conclusion that “in law the effects of the subsidies on
Airbus’ prices and sales constitute significant lost sales and significant
price suppression, within the meaning of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM
Agreement, as well as displacement and impedance of exports from
third country markets, within the meaning of Article 6.3(b)” at least
with regard to Boeing’s 100-200 and 300-400 seat single-aisle
products, although insufficient evidence was produced to validate a
similar decision regarding 787 aircrafts.197 Both parties agreed that the
B&O tax measures, considered together with certain federal subsidies,
“lead to an increase in revenues after the transaction (the sale of an
LCA),” meaning “both subsidies are directly tied to sales of individual

192
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LCA.”198 More specifically, the panel acknowledged that “the
subsidies lower taxes that Boeing pays and thereby increase Boeing’s
after-tax profits.”199 Considering these facts, the panel determined that
the B&O tax measures, along with certain federal subsidies, set Boeing
up in a more favorable position than it could otherwise have
achieved.200 First, these subsidies “enabled Boeing to lower its prices
beyond the level that would otherwise have been economically
justifiable, and . . . secur[e] sales that it would not otherwise have
made.”201 These subsidies also, in certain cases, “led to Airbus being
able to secure the sale only at a reduced price.” As a result, the
subsidies ultimately “served to entrench Boeing as the incumbent
supplier, thereby putting it at an important switching cost advantage
over Airbus in future sales of aircraft of the same family to that same
customer.”202 The panel would likely find the South Carolina
incentives that are similarly structured to the Washington incentives,
including any income tax reductions or sales tax exemptions, likewise
cause adverse effects to the interests of the European Communities for
the same reasons.
The above analysis and conclusion would also likely apply to the
South Carolina economic bonds, which Boeing is receiving explicitly
“to support Boeing’s 787 Program” in South Carolina. 203 Under the
South Carolina incentive package, Boeing will receive $270 million in
non-repayable bonds alone, of which slightly over $200 million will be
spent on the construction of the 787 assembly facility. 204 Boeing will
dedicate $10 million for the construction of roads and an additional
$53.9 million for “site work and utilities.” 205 The debt, including both
principal and interest at a rate of 3.3%, will be repaid from South
Carolina’s general operating fund. 206 Because the facility is intended
for work on the 787 product, these economic development bonds are
tied to the production of a specific product. Furthermore, the subsidies
from the state decrease the fixed cost of the 787 plant’s initial
production.
198
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However, in coming to this conclusion, the panel will have to
consider the fact that Airbus does not produce a product that directly
rivals the 787. The question then becomes whether it is possible to
displace or threaten to displace the sale of an aircraft that is not yet in
production. It is typical that a more advanced aircraft would surpass an
older version in sales to at least some degree. Even if the South
Carolina subsidies allowed Boeing to reduce the selling price of the
new Dreamliner 787, the price reduction would not affect Airbus’
aircraft sales. Most likely, potential buyers of the 787 would not
consider Airbus’s older-version aircrafts an alternative product because
the machines lack the new technology available in the 787. If the panel
were to determine that the production and sale of an aircraft for which a
competitor has no direct rival displaces or impedes the import or export
of a competitor’s aircraft, the panel would abolish competitive
advantage within the industry.
The second category of subsidies, comprising those that are not
product specific, would be considered in relation to an increase in
Boeing’s non-operating cash flow. Of the South Carolina incentives,
this would include the FILOT and the SSRCs. In the Boeing case, the
parties and the panel agreed that “where a subsidy is not tied to
production of a particular product, the subsidy may still affect the
behaviour of the recipient of the subsidy in a manner that causes
serious prejudice, depending upon the context in which it is used.” 207
However, the panel found no significant adverse effects to the interests
of the European Communities because the value of the remaining
challenged subsidies—$550 million over the course of seventeen
years—was de minimis and therefore irrelevant.208 According to a
study by the consulting group Miley & Associates, Inc., the FILOT
initiative, which reduced Boeing’s assessment rate to just 2% for fifteen
years and 4% until year thirty, is worth $53 million. 209 This amount
would most likely also be deemed de minimis and irrelevant. The
South Carolina incentives present a lower total savings and a longer
duration, which results in an even less significant average annual
savings. Thus, the South Carolina incentives are likely not prohibited
under the SCM Agreement.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the information available and in light of the panel
decision in the Boeing case, at least a portion of the South Carolina
incentives would most likely be actionable under the SCM Agreement.
An analysis of the incentives unveils the high likelihood that most, if
not all of the incentives, including the tax breaks and general obligation
bonds, are subsidies under the SCM Agreement because the incentives
are financial contributions that confer a benefit on the recipient. Of
these subsidies, the sales tax exemption for aircraft fuel is de jure
specific, while the sales tax exemptions for computer hardware and
construction materials are de jure non-specific under Article 2.1(b) but
de facto specific under Article 2.1(c). Like the sales tax exemption for
fuel, the general obligation bonds are de facto specific in that Boeing
has received a predominant share of the available subsidy. The
available evidence does not suggest that any of these subsidies are
export contingent; therefore, none of the subsidies are likely prohibited.
However, the effects of the South Carolina tax and bond subsidies do
cause significant lost sales and significant price suppression within the
meaning of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement, as well as
displacement and impedance of exports from third country markets
within the meaning of Article 6.3(b) for the 787 aircraft model. In
accordance with prior WTO rulings, the above result would command
the panel to recommend, to the extent that the United States has acted
inconsistently with the SCM Agreement, that the adverse effects be
removed or the actionable subsidies be withdrawn as required by
Article 4.7.
However, South Carolina’s incentives will likely never come
before the WTO panel.
The current Airbus-Boeing dispute
demonstrates the impracticality of WTO rulings. The current dispute
has become the most expensive dispute in WTO history,210 and there is
still no promise of an end in sight.211 Furthermore, the recent panel
ruling resulted in a purported victory by both sides. 212 Even Airbus
itself admits that it does not anticipate a solution to this dispute for a
number of years.213 In theory, the WTO panel’s ruling should rectify
210
John W. Miller & Daniel Michaels, Boeing Received Illegal Aid, WTO
Says, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
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the unjust subsidies and their effects. However, the probability of such
reaction is unlikely because the only repercussion of failing to do so is
the imposition of trade sanctions by the injured country—a hefty
decision that could spur retaliatory sanctions and other consequences
potentially more harmful than the effects of the initial subsidy. 214 As a
result, both sides continue to offer and accept arguably illegal
subsidies, such as those from South Carolina, while simultaneously
arguing before the WTO.
There is, however, some promise of reignited negotiations. 215
Even if the parties continue through the appeals process, it is almost
certain that both will exit the WTO proceedings partially defeated. 216
At that point, both sides will most likely prefer to negotiate another
agreement rather than either compensate each other for the illegal
subsidies or enter into a trade war. While a bilateral treaty may have
been preferable to both parties, such a solution is likely no longer an
option. First, this option lost some of its viability when the panel
released the following statement as part of its May 18, 2011 Appellate
Body Report on the Airbus case, which cast serious doubt on the legal
binding power of such bilateral treaties by emasculating the power of
Article 4 of the 1992 Agreement: “Article 4 of the 1992 Agreement is
not a relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations
between parties, within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention.”217 More importantly, however, the industry is rapidly
moving away from its duopolistic structure, which will render
irrelevant a bilateral agreement that does not take into account the new
market forces.
Economic forecasts suggest that the aircraft manufacturing market
will double in size to a value of $3.2 trillion by 2029. 218 A number of
emerging markets such as Russia, China, Japan, and Brazil are fighting
for a share of the $1.7 trillion aircraft manufacturing market 219 and are
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receiving bountiful government subsidies to ease their journeys.220
Russian aircraft manufacturers came together in 2006 as the United
Aviation Corporation.221 China is contemplating a similar move and
just reported that its Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China entered
into a 100 plane contract for its first jetliner in November, 2010.222 As
one market observer notes, the results of the WTO case will provide a
detailed instruction manual for “Airbus’s and Boeing’s next generation
of rivals” on how to successfully receive government aid. 223 The
entrance of new players in the aircraft manufacturing industry will
certainly change the market environment significantly.
In summary, while South Carolina’s House Bill 3130 appears to satisfy
the requirements of the SCM Agreement at least in part, the European
Communities would certainly have grounds for challenging the
subsidies, although it’s unlikely the European Communities would do
so. More importantly, however, the aircraft industry is in the process of
shifting out of a duopolistic structure. Airbus’s and Boeing’s actions
regarding subsidies will likely set precedent for these new players,
who, with the help of their own domestic subsidies, will have the
chance to usurp a significant portion of the market share from these two
dueling rivals.

220

Wittig, supra note 217, at 149.
Wolfgang Maennig & Stephan Wittig, WTO Dispute Settlement
Proceedings: European Support for Airbus in the Spotlight, 45
INTERECONOMICS 180, 187 (2010).
222
Id.; Lynn, supra note 219.
223
Madhu Unnikrishnan, Who is the Real Winner in the WTO Subsidy
Cases?, 172 AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. 14 (2010), available at 2010
WLNR 14381960 (Westlaw).
221

